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This is an issue that applies to Jamaican public servants, who can be removed from office by a finding of misbehavior. The Privy Council examined this issue in the case of Julia Lawrence v Attorney General of Grenada Privy Council Appeal No 14 of 2005.
Lord Scott of Foscote delivered the Majority Judgment.
Julia Lawrence was the Director of Audit of Grenada, an office established by the Grenada Constitution. Section 87 (6) of the Constitution says that:
“A person holding the office of Director of Audit may be removed from office only for inability to exercise the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause) or for misbehaviour and shall not be so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this section.”
On 11 August 1999 the appellant, the Director of Audit, wrote to Dr Keith Mitchell, who was at the time both the Minister of Finance and Prime Minister of Grenada, what the Privy Council described as an “intemperate and abusive letter.” This followed previous disagreements between the Director and the Finance Minister over her audit reports, which the Finance Minister had a constitutional duty to lay before Parliament within seven days of receiving them.
She submitted a report to him on the 1993 accounts on 31 December 1997 but he had not tabled it up to 2 April 1998 when they met, at her request, to discuss the matter. At this meeting the Minister indicated that he had some concerns about criticisms made in the report of the Accountant General.
When she wrote to him on 11 August 1999, neither the 1993 audit report nor her 1994 audit reports had been laid before the House.
The Director spoke to the Clerk of Parliament about this who told her, inter alia,
that that the copies he had received were not clean copies but had “lines” drawn through them and “side marks” on them.
The Director then wrote to the Finance Minister a letter that read, in part:
“I have been informed by the Clerk of Parliament that the reports submitted to him for laying were mutilated: they contained a number of scratches and insertions. IN EFFECT THE REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF AUDIT HAVE BEEN DOCTORED! This is UNCONSTITUTIONAL! It is UNETHICAL and is a TRAVESTY. You also provided comments from the Accountant General to lay therewith. What is your authority for amending my reports? The Constitution envisages you to act merely as a conduit for getting my reports to Parliament.”
She sent copies of the letter to the Clerk of Parliament and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Minister reacted by activating the process to remove the Director. A Tribunal was appointed:
“to determine whether she ought not to be removed from office for misbehaviour”.
The Tribunal concluded that she had:
“…misbehaved. She acted recklessly; and she wrongly and improperly made unsubstantiated and unjustified accusations that the Minister of Finance improperly interfered with, by altering or amending or mutilating (with scratches and insertions) her Reports Nos 1 and 2 of 1999 prior to their being laid in Parliament. We are in no doubt that such conduct was unbecoming of anyone holding the position of Director of Audit.”
The Tribunal advised the Governor-General that the Director ought to be removed from office. The Minister had not in any way altered or defaced or tampered with the appellant’s reports.
Alleyne J. found in her favour and set aside her removal from office.
Court of Appeal
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and re-instated the recommendation of the Tribunal and the removal of the appellant from office.
The Privy Council said that the words in the Director’s letter were “plain English” and could not be read:
“as other than an accusation against the Minister of serious personal impropriety consisting of the defacing and amending of her reports.”
Lord Scott made a point of stating that there were passages in the Tribunal’s report which suggested that the Tribunal regarded:
“the appellant’s indignation and remonstrations about the delay in the placing of her reports before the House of Representatives as an impertinence on her part, an officious meddling in something that was none of her business. Their Lordships are clear that that view of the matter was not justified as the Minister was in clear breach of his constitutional duty to lay the reports before Parliament.”
The Privy Council looked at the meaning of the word misbehaviour and approved the following statements by Grey J. in Clark v Vanstone  FCA 1105, in the Federal Court of Australia. Justice Gray stated that:
“…the meaning to be given to the word ‘misbehaviour’ will depend entirely upon the context of the legislative provision in which the term is used. There is no universal meaning of misbehaviour when it is used in a statute or other legislative instrument. When a statute provides for removal from office of a statutory officer on the ground of misbehaviour, it takes its meaning from the statutory context.”
He went on to say that:
“… to force misbehaviour into the mould of a rigid definition might preclude the word from extending to conduct that clearly calls for condemnation … but was not … could not have been foreseen when the mould was cast.”
“… to constitute misbehaviour by the holder of an office, the conduct concerned need not be criminal conduct and need not occur in the course of the performance of the duties of the office. For present purposes, the important proposition to be drawn from these expressions of opinion is that, in a case in which the term ‘misbehaviour’ is used with reference to the holder of an office, the content of its meaning is to be determined by reference to the effect of the conduct on the capacity of the person to continue to hold the office. In turn, the capacity to continue to hold an office has two aspects. The conduct of the person concerned might be such that it affects directly the person’s ability to carry out the office. Alternatively, or in addition, it may affect the perceptions of others in relation to the office, so that any purported performance of the duties of the office will be perceived widely as corrupt, improper or inimical to the interests of the persons, or the organisation, for whose benefit the functions of the office are performed. In either case, the danger is that the office itself will be brought into disrepute as a result of the conduct of its holder. If that is likely to be the case, then the conduct is properly characterised as misbehaviour for the purposes of the relevant legislation.”
The questions to be considered therefore are:
The Privy Council answered the first question in favour of the appellant, given evidence that she was very capable. They, however, answered the other three unfavourably, citing, inter alia, the content and tone of her letter which would raise questions as to whether she possessed the “dispassionate and objective mind” needed for the job, and her failure to promptly “withdraw her unfounded accusations against the Minister and to apologise for making them.”
Lord Scott said the Tribunal’s description of the appellant’s conduct as “unbecoming” was therefore an accurate assessment. They said since three of the four questions were answered unfavourably to the appellant, her conduct had been properly characterized as “misbehaviour” which warranted her removal from office. The appeal was dismissed with costs.